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G. Wesley Houp

Affidavit of the Woman Who
Jumped f ram Clay's Ferry Bridge

Jessica Hollis, Natalia Ruiz-Junco, and Brett Smith

Discourse and Civil Repair:
disClosure interviews Jeffrey C. Alexander
(3 December 2002)
Jeffrey C. Alexander is professor and Chair of
the Sociology Department at Yale University. Ile
has written extensively in social theory. Ilis books
Theoretical Logic i11 Sociology (1982-83), T1venty Lecl11res: Sociological Theory Since 1'17orld l't7ar Two (1987),

I laid low for the first week and surfaced
only once or twice the second. After
sixteen days in the water, I came up,
and now the fisherman who greeted me
shits his pants every time he thinks
of crappie fishing at the mouth of Dix River.

Aclio11 a11d Its E11viro111ne11ls: To111ards a New Sy11the.ris
(1988), and Fi11 de siecle Social Theory: Refalivis111 Red11ctio11, a11d the Proble111 of Reaso11 (1995) arc essential
1

You see, I was hung up in a deadfall
on the downstream side of the confluence.
He told the authorities that he saw me,
reached out, then I came right out of my skin.

to understanding contemporary theoretical debates
within sociology. Alexander's cultural sociology has
had a great impact. JTis call for the autonomous
sta tus of culture in sociological analysis has been
quite influential, as sociologists are theorizing culture in new and necessary ways. In his new book,
Alexander develops a theory of the civil sphere
emphasizing the role of culture in shaping the
structures of our political life.
Alexander was invited as the 2002 l"all Distinguished Author in Social Theory by the Committee
on ocial Theory at the University of Kentucky.
During his visit, Alexander delivered two talks entitled "Theorizing the Possibilities of Justice: The
Split Life of the Civil phere" and "Civil ociety
and the American Civil Rights Movement." Afterwards, disCloS11re had the opportunity to discuss
these talks and his new manuscript with him.

But the truth is that I came up exhausted
and held out a hand. The bastard spooked
and left me half naked, consumed,
just like every other man I've ever known.
So I let my body dissolve in backwater
where two rivers meet, where I'm
occasionally kissed by small fish and where,
beneath the calm surface, heavy, dark,
vague, nightmarish things pass close by.

disClosure: You arc just now completing a book
on civil society. Could you discuss the origins of
this project and situate your argu ment within recent studies of civil society?

C> 2003 dlsClosure: a journal
of social theory no. 12.
Committee on Social Theory,
University of Kentucky,
Lexington, KY
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Jeffrey Alexander: T his book comes out of the
experiences 1 had in the 1980's. I laving come back
from China in 1989, I realized there was a small
body of literature that was developing about civil
society and that there had been a transformation
of Marxism into a kind of radical democratic
theory. It coincided with my own interests in civil
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society that went back to the 1970's, which were stimulated by my interest in the
Watergate crisis, by my interest in Durkheim, G ramsci, and by Parsons's concept
of the societal community. All of these interests and backgrounds came together,
and I began working on this project.

dC: You mentioned an intellectual movement on the Left from Marxism to more
radical democratic approaches to social and political theory. I wonder if you could
comment on how this has played out at the level of local and national politics in
the United States. Criticisms of the recent elections and the failure of the Democrats to retain power in the house, focus on the inability of the Democrats to develop a specific, or distinctive, agenda or platform that would appeal to a number
of voters. According to these arguments, we do 1101 have the kinds of options that
individuals really want There seems to be, on the part of many citizens, a call for
a~other option as far as political parties and leaders go, but we arc not being provided one. Thjs seems to indicate a lack of parallelism between theory and practice. How might we account for this?

JA: I

think that the crisis of liberal or leftist ideologies creates various results. One
i~ .the movement towards democracy as the normative framework for a lot of polittcal theory: there has been a revival of democratic theory in the last ten or fifteen years-even moving away from distributive issues as they were articulated in
Rawls's work.

Anot.her re.suit is that the critique of capitalism by sociaHsm no longer carries substantial weight, because the alternative of socialism in a strong sense, which is a
non-market, state-directed organization of production and distribution, is basic~~ not th~ught of as viable now. So, that has presented the Left with this giant
cnsis of social democracy. Leninism and Maoism have virtually disappeared. This
creates a real challenge for the European and the American Left which is how to
work out a critical alternative to conservatism. The problem i; that the leaders
want to embrace the market, but they do not want to be conservative. So, they dcvel?p what's call~d the "new labor" in England, new forms of social democracy in
~hina a~d eve.n ~ France. Even in Spain, they arc all very market-oriented socialists. I think this is a bi~ ?roblem. The Democratic Party has problems, but J think
that th.e m?ve from c~ittcal theory towards radical democracy is a good move that
coul~ insp1rc a new kind of liberalism in the United States because radical democracy 1s more part of the republican tradition in the United States; radical democracy does not come from as far outside of this tradition.

dC: I won?er if this disaffection with the Democratic Party will create or
strengthen in ~ny way some part of the civil sphere? Will the civil sphere be
strengthened, 1f our regulatory institution or the State isn't pc c
·
· Sh OU Id?
rLorming as we
. k 1t
th 10

suggests that all associations that arc not state-directed arc civil society associations. Viictor Pcircz-Diiaz embraces that and articulates that in Spain, and his
work has been very influential.
I see that this framework is useful in struggles against totalitarian or authoritarian
societies because those societies try to repress autonomous associations. This perspective of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century theory has been reproduced and
brought back to contemporary consciousness because of the movements against
communism and authoritarianism. But once you have the transition, I personally
do not believe that this perspective is a very helpful understanding of civil society
or the civil sphere. Today, this could be called a neo-Tocquevillean approach to
civil society, and it has been brought to its highest level in American social science
by Robert Putnam, in his book Bo1vli11g A/011e and in his first book on democracy.

This approach is not very helpful because it docs not have a strong normative
traction, and it docs not have a strong empirical traction. In the spheres outside of
the state, there arc so many different kinds of groups, systems, fields, spheres of
justice, that it seems unproductive to lump them together in the concept of a civil
society. This approach would put together under the same rubric a capitalist corporation and a crusading social movement against capitalism, both being civil society organizations. 1 <lo not find that very helpful, though I agree that the
distinction between state and non-state is an important one. I am more interested
in developing a theory of the civil sphere that is tied to more differentiated and
specific moral criteria and cultural and political processes whjch would lead to a
kind of f Tabcrmasian idea. But I have a lot of criticisms of the Ilabermasian position.

dC: l n your new manuscript, you propose three categories of Civil ociety--Civil
Society I, TT, and 111. l t seems Civil Society 111 is a dialectical result of aspects of
both Civil ocicty Tand Civil Society II. Civil Society T1T is a category that retains
clements from both Civil Society T and Civil ocicty TI, namely the positive aspects of both: the moral and ethical endowment of Civil ocicty I and the differentiation of Civil Society TI resisting the identification of society with the
marketJA: And the negative aspects. Marx and Marxism identified civil society with selfishness, bourgeois society, individualism, and private property: I call that Civil ocicty IJ. 'T he idea, th en, was to abolish civil society. That had many ramifications.
It seemed very hard to establish a democratic theory that we would find acceptable today, if you had the idea that civil society would be abolished because that
partly suggested the abolition of the distinction of private and public; it suggested a Rousscaucan General Will; it suggested that property should be controlled by the public and perhaps by the State.

JA: I do
with--and necessarily I do not accept- the d'1s b. nct1on
·
. . not work
.
o f statc
and civil society. I have written a criticism of that as a
~:
·
f
conunuation o seven.
teenth- and eigh~ecnth-~e~tury poJjtical theory. I have called it Civil Society I in
my new manuscript. T his is a perspective that has been embraced b
· ,
· il
·
y various prof
ponents o civ society from the mid-1970s when th
b
b
.
.
,
c concept egan to e revived in Poland by Lcszek Kolakowski and Adam Michni' k B t T h' k h'
·
. u t in t 1s notion

But I do not think that the response to the problems of this kind of classical
Marxist view should be to go back to a traditionally liberal theory of Civil ocicty
1, which is very popular ideologically today in the United tates. President Clinton
gave a commencement address at UCLA a few years ago (20 May 1994) in which
he discussed what he called the "discourse of civil society." There is such a strong
argument that the market and democracy always go together and there is no ten-
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sion between them. But there is a tension between the market and the civil sphere,
as I have defined it. So, I think what is important is that if you look at Marx in a
different way, he had in mind a utopian vision of a solidaristic community that did
not give enough attention to autonomy. I would say it gave exaggerated emphasis
on community. But he was aware of the problems of capitalism, and I think that
the tension between capitalism and the civil sphere is an endemic one which will
be ongoing.

intense symbolic behavior in contemporary societies. But for the sociologist or the
social scientist, we need always to step back as far as we can and have a more detached relationship to the concepts we use. So, what I am recommending is that
the time has come to create a complex, sociological theory of civil society; to create such a theory has been difficult because the concept has been so highly contested, and that it still is difficult but possible to begin to subject civil society to
this kind of analysis.

I have this three-part notion of the three kinds of boundary relations between the
civil and non-civil spheres, which can be conceptualized as facilitating input. Let's
take the economy and the civil sphere. You can argue that markets and private
property help to produce the freedom of the civil sphere because they underpin
notions of autonomy: they encourage senses of responsibility, etc. They can also
be thought of as providing material goods that allow self-expression-there arc
many arguments that proceed in this manner. I would not wish to deny that there
are, but a conservative position would emphasize exclusively the facilitating inputs
from the private economy to the civil sphere. I would want to say that there arc
also destructive intrusions, such that the relations of the private market undermine to certain degrees and in certain ways the promise of respectful and reciprocal relationships of the civil sphere. They do so not by really producing inequality,
but by allowing inequality to be transferred into differential respect and power in
public and civil life. So, that is why I am trying to think of the third civil society as
different from the first two, but it is as you say a kind of dialectical synthesis of
some aspects of that.

And I do think that in real life, civil society still is an object of sacrality as subject
to ritualization. I use late Durkheimian theory in my new book, as I have been developing it over the years, especially in terms of the discourse of the sacred and
profane. To me, it is very important to attach Durkheim to semiotics to develop
the sense in which the binary oppositions of civil society provide a basis for
stigma and shame, anc.I that sets up a framework of exclusion-to legitimate
forms of exclusion. One of the core arguments of my book is that exclusions arc
generally legitimate with the core group and that the members of a core group arc
not excluding people only on the basis of their power to exclude people. They also
exclude people because insofar as they arc engaged in a project of modernization
or democracy, they exclude because they feel endangered by the pollution of categories of people whom they have constructed as dangerous to the project of
civil society. So that to come back into, or to come into, the civil sphere requires a
symbolic purification on the part of dominated groups, both in terms of their
own self-image at times but, more importantly, in terms of their framing by core
groups.

dC: In your manuscript you say that the civil society concept has been "secularized." Secularization is usually understood as the process by which what was once
sacred loses this quality. What are the theoretical implications of saying that the
civil society concept is now entering the secularized realm of social theory?

dC: So, it is the responsibility of the dominated group, the marginalized, to make
the core group sec them in a different light?

JA: What I meant by "secularization" was really in the context of the idea of the
relation of social movements to social science. I wanted to say that most of the
important concepts in social science, which arc treated today in a mundane way in
the sense that they are treated as objects of analysis, conceptualization, and empirical and theoretical research, were once highly contested sacred things in social
life. They still are to some degree. You can think of it as routinization if you want,
rather than movement from religious to secular: it is a metaphor. So, class docs
not arouse a great many social movements today, but it is an interesting concept in
social science. ~he same with race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, religion, poverty.
We have to realize that these concepts that moved into social science did so for
political and m~ral reasons ..Then they became secularized in the metaphorical
sense of bccomtng less emotionally laden for many people, though the normative
references of these concepts arc still there, and people, I think, care about them in
a moral and political sense, and that is why we study them.
But you raise an interesting point, which I worried about when J wrote that phrase
and when I re-read that phrase last year when I was editing the boo k. I do not
want to suggest that civil society is not a sacred concept. The way J understand it
civil society is part of the discourse of the sacred and the profane: it still inspire:

36

JA: T would not say that it is their responsibility in a moral sense. If we talk about
a moral responsibility, then 1 would say it is the responsibility of the core group to
include the outer group. Sociologically, social movements that are launched by
marginalized groups do not only try to gain power but they also try to gain legitimacy. And one way that they do so--and the most important way-is by re-framing their identities. A lot of political conflict in a quasi-democratic society is a
process of influence and persuasion. It is 1101 a matter of force. In that sense, my
theory is related to deliberative theories of democratic discourse. I am kind of
translating the notion that there is a discourse ethics and that democracy is based
on discourse into cultural, sociological idiom. I want to argue that I agree that political conflicts have a strongly discursive character. From the perspective of cultural sociology that I have developed, I am more pessimistic about the concept of
rationality. T sec reasonableness as a cultural category that has structural status
rather than an immanent quality of discourse itself. That suggests a different attitude. Jn order to be effective, the dissident movement has to be very clever in a
pcrformativc sense about framing its own demands and indeed its own identities
as legitimate in terms of the discourse of civil society.

dC: 1 want to push this deliberative model a little bit further. In your talk earlier
today, you claimed that social movements seek persuasion and not merely power.
'They want to acquire persuasion communicatively to give rise to a moral outrage
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in civil society: you talked about Birmingham trying to elicit moral outrage from
northern civil society. That moral outrage, in turn, sets in motion regulatory intervention, culminating in civil repair. This process mirrors in many relevant respects
Habermas's two-track model of deliberative politics developed and elaborated in
BetJveen Facts and Norms. There, Habermas refers to the "constitutionally legitimate
circulation of power'' where people in civil society attempt to influence the
agenda of parliament or congress. What this ultimately gives rise to is rational law,
which seems to be what is going on in at least this instantiation of the process of
civil repair. If your model is that similar to I Iabcrmas's, where is the distinction
between his model and yours? You mentioned earlier that you have criticisms of
Habermas? How is your model superior to, or at least better than, I Iabermas's?

JA: I have a kind of hero worshipping attitude towards I Iabcrmas, and that makes
him one of the living people for whom I still have a kind of boyish admiration
and enthusiasm, both in his private life and as a philosopher. I am very enthusiastic about Habermas. At the same time, my work has been inspired by l Tabermas in
many respects, and I have always been in a kind of productive dialogue with him
from my point of view, as many people have been, of course. I have had a lot of
problems with I Iabermas's rationalism, and I have articulated this in various ways.
The first problem: What is speech and what is language? This goes back to his
emphasis on speech in terms of pragmatics, and my feeling is that--and T said this
in my article "Ilabermas and Critical Theory: Beyond the Marxian Dilemma?"
which was reproduced in the Ilonncth and Joas edition on Ifabcrmas back in
1991-this pragmatics of the speech act arc insufficiently sensitive to the takcnfor-grantcd cultural presuppositions of language. This goes back to Saussure's distinction between speech and language. I am very interested in the language itself.
For me, IIabermas has tried to develop the notion that the reciprocity and the
norms of deliberation-in terms of transparency and respcct--and the commitment to seeking the truth come out of the speech situation itself. T mean that is
one of his several moves, a kind of post-Kantian move; whereas in my work T
have tried to argue that the standards of reasonableness precede the speech act and
are embodied in discourses.
My. understanclin~ of disc.o.urses comes from semiotics and poststructuralism,
which Habermas is very cntical of and is critical of for a number of reasons that
se~m to be both good and bad. This has been articulated in his critique of French
t:11IDk.er~. Ile conn.ccts an :mphasis on the structuredness of discourses, the prclingu1stic structunng of discourses, to Heidegger, to the conservative Romantic
traditions, to Gadamer, and to the notion of tradition itself. And so for f Iabcrmas
it has been very difficult to accept the given constraints on speech. f Tc is turning
to pragmatics and has turned away from the German and the J•'rench in some dcgre~ towa~ds an American and pragmatist understanding, even though he's sti ll
odbv1?usly m the German tradition of this. J don't think that is sociologically prouctive.

I had seen signs of it coming, like in the Postscript to Haber1J1as and The P11blic
Sphere, his references to public opinion, to culture. I have seen this gigantic transformation of I Iabcrmas from the 1960s work on the transformation of the public
sphere, where public opinion is sharply criticized as manipulated by capitalism, to
a later understanding that public opinion is a positive resource often and is a way
of working through issues in deliberation. My only real criticism of that part of
his work is that the concept of meaning and culture should be brought into that
more strongly, that the understanding of how movements and intellectuals and
others stimulate and criticize opinion in the weak publics has to be more elaborated in the way that I have described. And I don't necessarily think, at least in a
country like the United States, that the Parliament is the strong public. Maybe
more on the Continent and in places with a strong party, like in Germany or
maybe in England, 1 can sec privileging the Parliament. I would simply say the Parliament is a more regulated institution in that it articulates law, which is a different,
very fundamental dimension of the civil sphere. I think that the communicative
institutions that he is increasingly interested in arc equally important; I do not
think that they arc weak, they arc just not regulatory. They are much more plastic,
of course.

dC: I would like to ask you about another intellectual whose work you have discussed previously, Pierre Bourdicu. Jn your book Fi11 de Siecle Social Theory, you
seem to argue that there is a problematic relationship between structure and
agency in Bourdicu's work. What is your opinion of the Bourdieuian concept of
habit11s in relation with this problematic relationship between structure and
agency? Is the dichotomy of structure and agency still useful in social science? In
other words, can social scientists do without this dichotomy?

JA: Well, T have written a lot about this. To recapitulate what l have written, I
think that for Bourdieu, habit11s is the equivalent of the self. I Tc develops the idea
of habi/11s as an internalization of social structure, so that the person is able to act
as a carrier of status and class and some structures. That is an interesting idea because it allows him to put a great deal of emphasis on the actor and not simply
objective structures coercing people. lie secs that the habit11s is a central element in
the sense of social structure, but that it also has a subjective status.

Now, in his work on the weak and strong publics-in fact in Facts a1Jd Norms-he
does have a very interesting
socioloo1cal
theory that 1·s 1·n many respects quite
·
•
.
.e>complementary or consistent with mme. I was surprised to read that, even though

My problem with that is precisely his insistence on the isomorphism or the parallelism between self and social structure, which means that he docs not sec the self
in a modern society as having independence, or autonomy, vis-ti-vis social structure.
1 would say, following a sociological tradition of Weber and Durkheim and Parsons, but also somebody like G. rI. Mead, or even modern-day developmental psychology, like Piaget, or I1reudian psychoanalytic psychology, that one of the most
distinctive qualities of modern life is that the self-while a social product-has
developed the capacity for detachment and criticism, so that a fully socialized person is usually a person who is self-critical and critical of society. Bourdieu's notion
of habit11s suggests an overly socialized actor who reproduces social structure
without knowing it. Of course, reproduction is common and is an important dimension, but 1 think that there is much m ore going on with the self than he
thinks.
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dC: And the dichotomy between structure and agency is still useful for social
theory? Is it still necessary to try to dismantle or criticize this dichotomy?

JA: As long as there is going to be social theory, there arc always going to be conflicts over emphasis on structures and the emphasis on actors. It is a prominent
philosophical preoccupation, and it is part of modern and democratic social
structures that is a reflection of the emphasis on trying to provide legal guarantees
for freedom of expression as against social pressures. But I do not think that it is
properly conceptualized. I never have. I have always written against the dichotomy
of structure and agency. I have tried to work out various alternative formulations.
I think that the last time I did this at length was in the last chapter of a 1998 book
called Neofi111ctio11alistn a11d After and also in my essay "The Reality of Reduction:
The Failed Synthesis of Pierre Bourdieu" (Chapter 4) in Fi11 de Sitcle S orial Theory.
The problem is that an actor is not the same as an agent, that actors have agency,
they have freedom. There is free will; actors have autonomy. But the real capacity
for freedom comes from the socialized capacity to exercise self-control and to develop a moral standard. So, if we are looking for the resources for critical responses to social structure, whether it is a patriarchy or a class structure or
religious structure, I am not convinced that we need to turn to theories of radical
agency that are anti-structural. What we need to understand, rather, is how the
personalities, or the selves of actors, are produced culturally and socially in ways
that give people a sense of their cultural capacities for criticism. That is very important from the contemporary point of view. So, an actor who is fully apart from
social structure is exercising agency in the sense of freedom and criticism.
dC: I was interested in what you said earlier today in your talk about the ideas of
performance and melodrama as they relate to the civil rights movement. ln that
example it seems that the media, journalists, played a particular role in bringing
tha.t ?ra~a to an audience. The media was necessary for the uptake of civil rights
acbv~sts performance as the weak, oppressed victim confronting the uncivil,
donunant oppressor. That was forty years ago. Now we want to think about that
occurring on a global level. Ilow, given the changes public media has undergone in
the four decades, would it be possible for the media to play that kind of role-especially ~the US, where the media that we arc so often confronted with is corporat~ :°1edia? ~ven though we have alternative news sources-independent and
politically radical web sources, for instance- these arc not as visually pervasive
and accessible as say something like CNN.
JA: Yes, that.is som.cthing that I am concerned about. The thing I want to stress is
that the media was JUSt as corporate then as now. The mass media can have diffcr~nt economic bases; it c~uld be a nonprofit but government agency like the BBC;
1t could be a profit-making company like the New York Times. Jn either case, it
c.an also be ~oo~ed on as a co.mmunicativc institution of civil society. An instituoon can be m different domains at the same time. So, just because a news outlet
or even people who run Saturday night sitcoms, need to and want to make ~
profit, it doesn't mean. that they only serve themselves or the needs of capital. Although there are conflicts between profit making and the public 1·n teres t m
· vanous
·
ways, what we see in newspapers and in television news arc two factors which al -
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low them to also function as institutions of the civil sphere.
One is journalism as profession, and in the last fifty to seventy-five years there's
been an increasing professionalization of the journalist's role. This has been
widely written about, so that if you go back a hundred years or a hundred and fifty
years, you would sec no distinction between editorial and news, for example, in
newspapers. You would barely see distinctions between advertising and news reporting. Even though I have written about and believed that news itself is a form
of narration- it's not an objective recounting of events-nonetheless, there's a
lot of sense of the autonomy of the journalist and there are continuous tensions,
therefore, between journalism and management in terms of the pressures. So,
whenever there's a buying out of a newspaper or efforts to bring together media
and 'IV in a single outlet, there arc a lot of protests and a lot of conflicts about
whether that would undermine the integrity and the autonomy of the journalist.
What is journalism and news reporting? It is an interpretation of an event from
the point of view of public opinion. The public opinion is not homogeneous; it is
fragmented, and sometimes it is polarized. lt is certainly different if it is liberal,
conservative, and there arc other divisions that sometimes arc relevant. But, that
to me is the primary framing clement, 1101 the profit-making nature of the company that the journalist works for, except in certain issues.
So, today, if we arc thinking about news reporting, I think the corporate nature of
the news is a constant; I do not think it is varied. I mean, there are larger companies, and if I am thinking of CNN and how it reports news, I think its main
source of bias is that it is an American company, not a capitalist one. It is a sad
thing that in the world that the only worldwide source of news in most of the
countries of the world is an American news company. And it is very strange indeed.
I think that there is a growing conservatism among journalists today, and the news
media reflects an ideological turn towards at least the center and the Right in the
society. f'or the first time in the U , we have Pox news, which is an overtly conservative network, and we have a weakness of critical liberalism as an ideology. This
is reflected in the ability of Bush to seduce journalists to accept his point of view.
But that seduction is structured in the very differentiation of society. To the degree that the civil sp here is autonomous, to that degree every person who holds
power would try to seduce it. A liberal or a leftist has to seduce the news media
and so docs a rightist. Kennedy, Roosevelt, they were all famously seductive towards the media, and they tried to control the independence of the public sphere,
and make it their own.
I think one way to seduce, to most effectively win, the media is to mount an effective performance to the American public and to the people who stand for the
public, which arc the journalists and the editors of the media. It is not a matter of
corporate money co ntrolling the interpretation of journalists and audiences.
Rather, it is a matter of conservative dramaturgy seeming convincing and persuasive in a competitive field to, if not journalists, then large sections of audiences.
So, the reason why performance is critical is because of the differentiation and
distance of citizens from poli tical actors, which is a product of a complex society.
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There is no way that any of us will ever closely observe a politician, I have never
seen them personally. I am sure most people have not Everything is mediated
through media of mass communication. Therefore, it is inevitable that the actions
of those who want to be persuasive to a public will have a pcrformative quality. It
does not mean that that is an inauthentic or deceptive action in a moral sense.
This is a pretty complicated question, the relationship between authenticity, performance, honesty, and integrity.

dC: What you have just said is relevant to the distinction that you make in your
recent work between cognitive and expressive media. This distinction seem s
somewhat arbitrary, especially if we take into account the expressive aspects of
cognitive media contents. Do you think we could question the distinction between
cognitive and expressive media?

JA: Yes, we can. I wanted to imply the distinction mainly to distinguish between
media that presents itself as merely factual and concentrated in information, and
the media that explicitly presents itself as non-informational, as in the little paragraph at the end of movies saying, any relationship between the characters and
events in this movie and real life are purely coincidental. Whereas in news reporting, they say that they are referring to real events. But, my point in the book, and
in other things I have written about the media, is that news reporting is causal representation and is guided by narrative and semiotic considerations. Most good stories tell a narrative, in fact, they are called stories; they arc not just reports. They
have protagonists; they have antagonists; they have a sense of what the dangers
are. And they identify and help to crystallize powerful symbol s. So, I agree with
you that cognitive media have strong expressive aspects. At the same time, expressive media have strong moral implications. I wanted to draw on some work in the
humanities to talk about the moral contents of fiction. I think it is very important
that societies work through a lot of their political concerns in terms of simple
dramas that are broadcastcd in movies and television or in pulp fiction of various
kinds.

dC: You made a claim yesterday that theorizing justice suffers from trying to keep
the universal and the particular separate, I guess too separate. And you want to sec
universalism more concretely, and I think that the vehicle for that is the discourse
of civil society, which is structured in binary oppositions at three levels between
persons, interactions, and institutions. Could you elaborate the discourse of civil
society itself in the context of how this is going to concretize universalism?

JA:

If you read Rawls, Habermas, Dworkin, or the more classical philosophers
before them, you see a continuous reference to the word "reason," to the term
"rationality," and to the concept of "universals." And these references arc themselves offered sometimes as evaluative criterion to judge action and moral judgment, or sometimes simply operationalized in terms of different kinds of
procedures which will allow people to judge rationality or universaHs m. The way J
see cultural sociology is not to say that people arc irrational in the sense that they
don't pursue necessarily universalistic ideals. I think people do try to be universalistic in their judgments and that they do try to be rational. But what I wanted to
emphasize is that rationality is carried by concrete symbol s and by concrete Ian-
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guagcs. So, in the case of the discourse of civil society pcop~c are ca~ght ~nsi~e of
the language game, in which there arc fairly rigid sets o~ dich~to~es, like md~
penden t/ dependcn t, open/ close, honest/ dishonest, rattonal/ trratton.al. That JS
what I meant by more concrete. It is a set of words that actually occu~ m eve~y~ay
speech. You can sec it at all levels of the society. I conclude from this ~at Jt 1~ a
very accessible and intuitively understood set of concepts that have thetr own internal organization that are used. That is what I mean by more concrete, and not
abstract. I do not think people strive to be rational actors. They want to see themselves symbolically in terms of values. They want to avoid pollution and stigma~
zation, and they want to have a sense of purity and charismatic power. I am still
speaking here strictly in terms of the codes. of ci~il ~ociety. These te~ms-sacred
and profane--arc articulated in terms of this sem1ottc structure o.f discourse. ~ut
further than that, these words themselves arc often understood m terms of images and stories, which in I Tabermas's sense arc part of the li fc:-Vorld and th~ ethical sphere. By trying to live up to, or live out, or make your !J~c parallel with an
admired social narrative, that is how people would act democratically, not because
they have the capacity for rational action in the sense that I Iabermas describes it. I
told this to Jfabcrmas, and he said, you arc not making a philosophical argument,
and that he was not making a sociological argument. I said, that is true. So, I am not
sure how these really relate to each other, but I sec these as the alternatives. It
could be considered a sociological translation of the concerns of discourse ethics,
or it could be considered an alternative sociology to a discourse ethics.

dC: To your mind, I Iabcrmas, and maybe even Rawls, privileges ~easo~ too m~ch
such that it is disconnected from culture. You maintain that what JS rational actton
is itself coded by a given culture, usually the culture that is dominant. lPe act this
way, so this is always going to be on the positive side of the binary divide, and anyone who is not like 11s is going to be ostracized a nd rendered impure. Arc not
I Iabermas, Rawls, and other philosophers trying to preserve rationality and reasonableness so that it doesn't get that cultural tinge because such an admixture
creates a lot of problems?

JA: J would say that you have to find some ground between, on the one hand, a

?e

purely relativistic position that would say, sociologically, anything can
und~r the
guise of rationality or reason and, on the other hand, a pur:ly philos~p~tcally
grounded argument for the universality of rcason~blcn~ss. I th1~k that w1th~n the
IJabermasian tradition there is a reaching toward discursive practices and deliberation as generating, in an imminent sense, the commitments and standards of rational action.
There arc probably two sources of the discourse of civil society. Pir.st, not all societies arc committed to rationality. 'fhat is a relatively modern, rclattvely Western
kind of conception. lt involves associated ideas about autonomy and individuality.
1t is not an ideal of many other civilizations in history. So, that is relatively recent,
and relatively specific, although it is spread out all over the world. One source of
the concern with rationality is certain cultural-political traditions that date back to
Wes tern traditions: Greece, Judaism, Christianity, Roman law, medieval constitutional ism and parliamentarism, civic republicanism, socialism, scientific revolution. A ll these movements have made commitments to certain ideals of autonomy
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and rationality in their own ways. They have made deposits in the bank of Western
culture, as it were. I believe that in non-Western cultures there arc also equivalents
of these. I think Islam has it in its renaissance times, and I Iinduism and Buddhism
also have parallel conceptions, but I am not competent to make observations
about those societies.
But the other thing, and this is more of a Ilabermasian move, is that if you set up
a thought experiment and you say, "what are the requirements of self-governing
collectivity?" and "what would be the kinds of people that would have to occupy
that so that they would not be subjugated to power or coercion?" I think you
would come up with a lot of the positive sides of the discourse of civil society.
People need to be honest; they need to be autonomous; they need to be cooperative. Because if they were not that, then why would we want to protect freedom
of speech, why give people so much autonomy? We would want to have surveillance over them and to control them, which is what we do when we put people in
jail. We have young children who cannot control themselves and arc closely supervised. In that sense, I think that a lot of these politics grow out of some kind of
imp~cit thinking about what the requirements of self-regulation arc. I suppose
that is parallel to 1Iabermas's notions of the ethics that arc immanent to discourse.
But they are not exactly the same.
d~: I just wa~t to be clear~ earlier you said that this discourse of civil society or
this demo~rallc language 1s often seen as images. Arc you referring to these
groups secmg themselves symbolically in terms of these values?

JA: Yes, in a performative sense. So, let us say we arc trying to think about Jesse
Jackson. Jesse Jackson or Al Sharpton-even more clearly-makes certain commen~ or gives a speech. The speech is reproduced in the newspapers and in the
m~dia, and people talk about it. Arc these people employing purely rational cvalu~
attve standards? The people ask: "Is Al Sharpton a democratic leader or is he a
demagogue?"; "Is he going to help the cause of dcmocrati%ation or is he a racist
who ~s undermini.ng it?" It is h.ard to ~akc those evaluations without the image of
M~ttn Luther King, Jr. The unage 10 the collective memory of Martin Luther
King, Jr., what he embodies in a symbolic sense, is a regulating device to control
and to gu_id.c our evaluations of Al Sharpton's speech. And that's the way the culture-as 1t 1s processed-works to propel ethical evaluations in public discourse.

dC: You just mentioned collective memory. Could you comment on Maurice
Halbwachs's concept of collective memory?
JA: I think Halbwachs made a brilliant connection from late Durkhcimian sociology to ~ notion .of memory and institutionalizing memory, monuments, and
manuscripts. lle ~ntroduccd a. ~orion that has become very much an object of
study and theory 10 the humanities and social sciences.

dC: So, could this concept be used for doing cultural analysis?

JA:

Yes, of course, but there has been a lot of work that has referenced
Halbwachs,
of works in collective memory that arc a Iso D urkh c1m1an,
· ·
.
.a number
.
like somethmg
tn Paul Connerton's book on memory I thi.nl th
·
.
.
·
{ ere arc two issues.
One 1s the relation of collective memory to psychoanalysis. 'l'h at 1S
· a b.ig JSS
· UC m
·
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the humanities. Many people use psychoanalytic theories relating to trauma and
memory, but I would be reluctant to use psychoanalysis for that. I would want to
link it more to social and cultural processes. The other issue is the relation of the
whole Durkheimian tradition to ideas. There is a separateness between Weber and
Durkheim. Durkheim is interested in the social processes of religion. Ile was not
interested in the history of ideas. Weber was interested in the history of ideas, and
he wasn't that interested in developing an abstract theory of religion as Durkheim
was. In terms of collective memory, we need to have a theory of ideas as well as
processes. So, we need to have a theory of semiotics and discourses and performance.

dC: To follow up on the issue of collective memory, in your talk earlier today, I
was disconcerted by a distinction I thought was being made between what was
going on in the South in terms of race relations and what was going on in the
North. At least it appeared that in your talk the North was being privileged in a
way as a more civil place for black Americans as opposed to the South. Por me
that charactcri%ation rcinscribcs the whole notion that we-as a society with a collective memory- have of what race relations is and was, which by and large is still
centered o n what happened in the South in the 1960s. So, it is those images of
Bull Connor ancl the water hoses that largely determine our perception of race relations, of what racial oppression is. I wondered if you could comment on that.
This focus on the South seems to ignore aJI the race riots in the North and other
movements not centered on Martin Luther King, Jr.
JA: I was aware of that as I was writing this. And, of course, one of the most notable and disconcerting and tragic aspects of Martin Luther King Jr.'s life is that
when he did move to the North in 1965 and until his death in 1968, he was overwhelmed by the structures of racial domination and focused especially on the
construction of the racial underclass in the inner cities of the United tatcs, the
11orthern U nitcd States. f Tc found these much more impenetrable and difficult to
develop guilt over as compared to those structures of Jim Crow in the outh. So,
what to do with that?
My focus was on how Jim Crow structures were overcome. In that sense the
North did not have Jim Crow. They had a different kind of racial structure. There
were definitely strong racial feelings, and it's possible that some of the successes
of the civil rights movements were because of northerners. The civil rights movement was compatible with racial feelings towards blacks. Most northerners did not
have and don't have day-to-day experiences with black people that southerners did
and often do today. So, it was possible that there was even an anti-southern antagonism that fueled northerners' identification with the black civil rights movements, and it is their willingness at some point eventually to come down against
the white power structure in the South. That itself was probably facilitated by stereotypes about southern whites in the sense of the difference of northern whites,
which was probably oversimplified.
We arc aware today that the racial relations in the outh arc 1101 different from the
North and vice-versa and some people make the argument that they arc better in
some southern cities than in northern cities. There arc so many challenges of ra-
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cial relationships today; these problems of racializcd perceptions and of the
underclass have remained and have posed problems and challenges that arc continuing. Society has dealt with racism in interesting ways in the last fifty years: progressive people talked about multiculturilism and tried to find ways of embracing
racial difference rather than homogenizing the races. Even someone like Martin
Luther King Jr. was looking towards a colorblind society. What's interesting is that
difference is more important, more accepted, today as a normative gtildcline to
racial relationships than colorblindness.
Yet, the problem with the racial underclass has not been effectively addressed.
And one of the implications of my treatment would be that before any politicalor economic- or state-centered solutions to the underclass would develop there
would have to be a social movement from the black population that would generate identification with the suffering and degradation of blacks in the underclass.
And that identification would have to be established between whites and blacks.
Otherwise what we have today is the sense that the people in the underclass arc
polluted, that they don't deserve public attention, that the underclass is a place in
which there is crime and drugs, that people bring this on themselves. This is reinforced by a number of developments like the internal stratification and residential
mobility of working-, middle-, and upper-class blacks out of the underclass. So, 1
do think that this suggests ways of dealing with those problems but it docs not
articulate them once and for all.

JA: Tdo not think that any social science is simply descriptive. Nor is it simply explanatory. All my work from the early 1980s on has developed a post-positivist
theoretical position that shows that.

Works Cited
Alexander, Jeffrey C. Fin de Siecle Social Theory. Relalivislll, Red11clio11, and The Problem
of Reason. London and New York: Verso, 1995.

- . Neoft111clionolis111 and After. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1998.
Calhoun, Craig, ed. Haberlllos and The P11blic Sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1992.
Clinton, William J. Speech. Pauley Pavilion, UCLA. 2 June 1994.
Connerton, Paul. Ilo1JJ Societies Rt111e1J1ber. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
I fabermas,Jurgen. Be/J11ee11Facts011d Norms: Co11trib11tions lo a Disco11rse Theory of La111
011d De111otracy. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1996.

Co1111111111icotive Actio11: Essqys 011 Jiirgen
Co1111111111icotive Actio11. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,

JIonneth, Axel, and I Tans Joas, eds.

Hober111os~ The Theory

of

1991.
Putnam, Robert D. Bo111ling Alone: The Collapse a11d Revival of A111erico11 Co1111m111i!J.
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.

dC: I am wondering if the collective memory of the civil rights movement is
somehow preventing the current underclass or representatives of the underclass
to imagine performances that would have some kind of efficacy.

JA:

Some people would say that black leaders have not found a successful new
ideology to cover this problem. They would further say that the notion of the African American as purely a victim, which is sometimes promoted by would-be
leaders of lower-class African Americans, is no longer as effective because there
have been forty years of affirmative action and there is a great deal of mobility
and success at many levels of the class structure for African Americans.

There are no black social movements today; the only real movements arc still in
the realm of Black NationaJism or the Nation of Islam. 'I'hcre no longer seems to
be any of the social forces that existed in the black community for such a long
time. Eventually there will be, and I'm curious to sec what kind of movements
there will be.
dC: In the first chapter of your book you say that "only by understanding the
boundary relations between civil and uncivil spheres can we convert civil society
from a normative into a real concept that can be studied." And then you make the
further claim that "only by understanding civil society in this realistic manner can
we develop a critical normative theory about the incompleteness of civil society."
I think this is an interesting juxtaposition of passages, one leaving the work ambiguous as to whether it is normative or descriptive or if it is both. Where would
you put the emphasis? What would you like the reader to take from the book in
terms of its emphasis on normativity or descriptive signs?
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